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NOTE
HOT-CARGO AGREEMENTS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY:
RESTRAINTS ON
SUBCONTRACTING
UNDER THE PROVISO TO SECTION 8(e)
The National Labor Relations Act1 includes a general policy
against secondary union activity-union pressure exerted against a
neutral employer in order to influence the labor relations of another
employer.2 In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed strikes and boycotts
for secondary objectives, 3 but a loophole in the Act rendered agree-
ments aimed at secondary objectives immune from scrutiny under the
labor laws.4 These agreements are known as "hot-cargo" contracts, a
term that arose from their original use by the Teamsters Union.5
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
2. The key anti-secondary provisions, id. §§ 158(b)(4), 158(e), derive from the Labor-Man-
agement Relations (raft-Hartley) Act, id. §§ 141-197, as amended by the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, id. §§ 151-169. Secondary activity has been
defined as union action, such as threats, strikes, or boycotts, designed not to affect the labor poli-
cies of the employer at which the action is directed, but rather to influence the labor policies of
another employer. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644-45 (1967).
To prevent this activity, section 8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(A) (1976), makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to strike, boycott, threaten, or
coerce any person with the object of forcing that person to enter into a prohibited secondary
agreement; section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976), makes it an unfair labor practice to
threaten or coerce a person with the object of forcing that person to cease doing business with
another person; and section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union and an employer to enter into an agreement to refuse to handle the goods of or to cease
doing business with any other person. See generally Nash, Connell "Hot Cargo"Agreements The
Supreme Court as Interpreted by the NLRB, 83 DICK. L. REv. 661, 662-66 (1979).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
4. The Supreme Court created this loophole with its decision in Local 1976, United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93, 107-11 (1958). Congress was aware of this deci-
sion's impact on Taft-Hartley. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1959),
reprintedin I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND Dis-
CLOSURE AcT OF 1959, at 474-75 (1959) (minority views) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HIST.]; H.R.
REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1959), reprinted in I LEGIS. HIST., supra, at 778-79. See
also National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 633-36 (1967).
5. The Teamsters Union inserted these provisions in its contracts with trucking firms. A
company that wanted to ship goods with a trucker whose employees were represented by the
Teamsters had to recognize the Teamsters to prevent his goods from becoming hot cargo-goods
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In response to widespread dissatisfaction with the labor laws' tol-
erance of secondary agreements, 6 Congress amended the Act in 1959
by adding section 8(e),7 which curtails the freedom of unions and em-
ployers to make hot-cargo agreements. The amended Act does not ab-
solutely prohibit all secondary igreements, however. A proviso to
section 8(e) gives a limited exception for subcontracting agreements 8
between a union and an employer in the construction industry; a sec-
ond proviso creates a more generous exception for the garment indus-
the Teamsters would not handle. See Fleming, Title VI" 7he Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw.
U.L. REV. 666, 686 (1960). The term "hot cargo" contract has come to embrace all secondary
agreements "by which the employer promises not to use the materias--or... the services-of
nonunion employers." Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.
v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341, 1343 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionfor rehearing en banc granted, No. 78-
3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
6. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT
FIELD (MCCLELLAN COMMITTEE), FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
Senator Dirksen introduced the remarks of Secretary of Labor Mitchell into the Congressional
Record to illustrate the hostility to these hot-cargo clauses: "The testimony before the select com-
mittee again and again illustrated the method by which certain unions, particularly the Teamsters,
utilized the inadequacies of the present secondary boycott provisions to force employers to do
business with only those people approved by union officials." 105 CONG. REC. 1730 (1959), re-
printed in II LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 993.
7. Section 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases
or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or
otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void:
Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or
repair of a building, structure, or other work: Providedfurther, That for the purposes of
this subsection and subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section the terms "any employer", "any
person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce", and "any person"
when used in relation to the terms "any other producer, processor, or manufacturer",
"any other employer", or "any other person" shall not include persons in te relation of
ajobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of
the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production inthe apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this subchap ter
shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing excepton.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704, 73 Stat. 519(1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976)).
On the background of section 8(e), see generally C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW645-74 (1971); Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLeA §§ 8(b)(4) and
8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000 (1965); St. Antoine, Secondary Boycotts andHot Cargo: A Study in
Balance of Power, 40 U. DET. LJ. 189 (1962); Comment, Subcontracting Clauses and Section 8(e)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1176 (1964); Comment, Hot Cargo Clauses:
The Scope of Section 8(e), 71 YALE L.J. 158 (1961).
8. This note refers to agreements between a union and an employer concerning the em-
ployees subcontracting practices as "subcontracting agreements."
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try.9 The construction industry proviso allows a union to agree with an
employer in the construction industry to restrict subcontracting at the
job site to firms employing union workers.10 These agreements are sec-
ondary because they use the general contractor to pressure the sub-
contractors to recognize the union as the representative of the
subcontractor's employees.
The purposes and scope of the construction industry proviso have
long been disputed." The Supreme Court's decision in Connell Con-
struction Co. v. Plumbers Local 10012 intensified the debate over the
type of subcontracting agreement that the proviso was designed to pro-
tect. The Connell Court held that the construction industry proviso
does not protect a subcontracting agreement negotiated outside of a
collective bargaining context and not confined to the particular job site
where the union members are present.13 This decision put in question
the legality of commonly used construction industry subcontracting
agreements. According to the General Counsel of the National Labor
9. While the construction industry proviso permits unions and employers to enter into cer-
tain secondary agreements, and allows construction unions to exert coercive pressure to obtain
such agreements, see notes 67-73 infra and accompanying text, the garment industry proviso fur-
ther allows unions to enforce such agreements by coercive pressure. See Danielson v. Joint Bd. of
Coat Workers, 494 F.2d 1230, 1237 (2d Cir. 1974).
10. Restrictions on subcontracting are valid, without regard to the construction industry pro-
viso, if they are addressed to primary aims. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S.
612 (1967). Clauses that limit subcontracting to preserve traditional bargaining-unit work are
primary. They seek not to change the labor policies of another employer, but to maintain work
traditionally given to the union members by their own employer. Cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (the contracting out of work that bargaining-unit employees
traditionally perform is a mandatory subject of bargaining). Similarly, area-standards or union-
standards clauses, which require a subcontractor to pay wages at the prevailing union rate, are
lawful primary clauses; they are designed to discourage subcontracting and to prevent the erosion
of negotiated standards. See Comment, Picketing for 4rea Standards: An Exception to Section
8(b)(7), 1968 DuKE L. 767. By contrast, union-signatory subcontracting clauses (particular-
union clauses), which restrict subcontracting to firms that have a contract with the union that has
signed the subcontracting agreement, are secondary. They seek to widen the union's representa-
tion of workers by compelling subcontracting firms to recognize the union. These clauses advance
general union aims, rather than specific objectives of the bargaining unit. See Heavy, Highway,
Bldg. & Constr. Teamsters Comm. (Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass'n), 227 N.L.R.B. 269, 276
(1976) (Member Fanning, dissenting in part). A provision phrased as a union-standards clause
may be construed as a union-signatory clause if the terms with which the subcontractor must
comply match too closely those of the signatory union. See Carpenters Local 944 (Woelke &
Romero Framing, Inc.), 239 N.L.R.B. 241 (1978), enforcedas modfedsub nom. Pacific Northwest
Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petition
for rehearing en banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
11. See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); Northeastern
Ind. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council (Centlivre Village Apartments), 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964),
enforcement denied, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
12. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
13. Id. at 635.
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Relations Board (NLRB), Connell "significantly narrowed the scope of
the proviso from the broader interpretation previously given it by the
Board and the Courts."' 4
Before Connell the NLRB had considered a subcontracting agree-
ment lawful as long as it was negotiated in a collective bargaining con-
text.15 After Connell the question was more complex. First, Connell
left open the possibility that in order to be sheltered by the proviso, a
subcontracting agreement must not only be negotiated in a collective
bargaining context, but must also be limited to particular sites where
union members were working.' 6 Second, Connell raised questions
about the lawfulness of a subcontracting agreement that required a
subcontractor to recognize not just any union but the particular union
that had made the subcontracting agreement.' 7 Finally, Connell did
not make clear whether a prehire agreement, the standard type of col-
lective bargaining agreement in the construction industry, would satisfy
the requirement that the union and employer have a collective bargain-
ing relationship.' 8
Two courts of appeals recently faced these issues. A panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Pacfc Northwest Chapter of
14. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum on Connell, Guidelines for Handling Section
8(e) Construction Industry Proviso Cases Under the Supreme Court's Connell Decision at I
(1976), reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 295 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRB General Coun-
sel's Memorandum]. Several cases after Connell held that a collective bargaining agreement was
not sufficient to protect a secondary subcontracting clause under the construction industry proviso
unless the clause was limited to particular job sites where union employees were present. See
notes 150-58 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Plumbers Local 100 (Hagler Constr. Co.), NLRB Case No. 16-CC-447 (May 1, 1974).
The General Counsel's Memorandum supporting his decision not to issue a complaint against
Plumbers Local 100 is reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 298 (1974).
16. See 421 U.S. at 633. See also note 108 infra.
17. See 421 U.S. at 630-35. By stressing the fact that Congress did not wish to foster top-
down organizing, the Court cast doubt on subcontracting agreements that specify a particular
union rather than allowing any union. See also Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859,
884-86 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.
v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341, 1350 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979),petiion for rehearing en banc granted, No. 78-
3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
18. For a definition of a prehire agreement, see notes 105-06 infra and accompanying text.
The Court suggested that a prehire agreement under section 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1976) might
be adequate. Rejecting an argument that the NLRB had already decided the issue in Conneli
(whether a subcontracting agreement fell within the construction industry proviso even if the
union that negotiated it had no collective bargaining relationship with the employer), the Court
distinguished Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (B & J Investment Co.), 214 N.L.R.B.
562 (1974), by noting that it may have involved a prehire agreement. 421 U.S. at 631-32 n.10. The
Court's reference, however, did not purport to decide the issue. See Donald Schriver, Inc. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 859, 873 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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the Associated Builders and Contractors v. NLRB, 19 rejected the view
that a collective bargaining relationship alone privileges a subcontract-
ing agreement under the construction industry proviso to section 8(e).
The court reasoned that the sole purpose of the proviso is to allow
agreements designed to alleviate the friction between union and non-
union employees working shoulder to shoulder on a job site.20 A sub-
contracting agreement, even in a collective bargaining context, thus
may not lawfully restrict subcontracting to union firms except in the
common-situs situation.21 The court indicated that were an agreement
appropriately limited, however, it could specify a particular union that
subcontractors must recognize.22 The court did not address the suffi-
ciency of prehire agreements.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Don-
ald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB,23 disagreed with the Ninth Circuit on the
scope of the construction industry proviso. Donald Schriver held that
two concerns lie behind the proviso: first, to enable unions to avert
common-situs tension; and second, to permit standardization of work-
hag conditions and protection of the employment opportunities of
union members.24 The second purpose justifies subcontracting agree-
ments that apply to all job sites at which work is done by the signatory
union's craft. The court also upheld subcontracting restraints on other
crafts, because these restraints help avoid common-situs tension.25 Fi-
nally, Donald Schriver held that a prehire agreement meets the collec-
tive bargaining requirement set out in Connell.26
The conflict between Pacfc Northwest and Donald Schriver stems
from divergent views of the purposes behind the construction industry
proviso and of the proper interpretation of Connell. This note exam-
mnes the scope of the proviso. First, the note sketches the background of
the proviso and its application by the courts. Second, the note analyzes
the ambiguities in the Connell Court's reasoning and the confusion that
Connell has engendered. Finally, the note turns to the recent decisions
by the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and District of Columbia Cir-
19. 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),peditonfor hearing en banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir.
Aug. 19, 1980).
20. 609 F.2d at 1349-50.
21. The common-situs situation consists of the presence of many employers on a single job
site. For an example of a common-situs arrangement, see Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
22. 609 F.2d at 1350 n.8. The court believed that frictions on thejobsite might occur as easily
between members of different unions as between union and nonunion workers.
23. 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
24. Id. at 880.
25. Id. at 883-84.
26. Id. at 872-73.
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cuits. The note argues that the Pacfc Northwest court failed to con-
sider adequately the legislative history of section 8(e), the pattern of
bargaining in the construction industry, and the interaction of the ap-
plicable labor laws. The Donald Schriver court displayed greater ap-
preciation of the special circumstances of the construction industry,
and therefore framed a more appropriate response to the post-Connell
issues. In conclusion, the note explores the tension between Donald
Schriver and Connell concerning the effect of subcontracting agree-
ments on nonunion firms, and suggests that Connell be limited to ac-
commodate the construction industry's realities that Donald Schriver
recognized.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY PROVISO
A. Prelude to Section 8(e): Denver Building Trades and Sand
Door.
The NLRB did not assume jurisdiction over the construction in-
dustry until the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947.27 Hence, the pat-
tern of collective bargaining between construction unions and
employers developed independently of doctrines that the Board im-
posed on other industries. When the Board applied the Act to con-
struction unions after 1947, confficts emerged between the unique
features of the construction industry and the general provisions of the
Act.28
27. Labor-Management Relations (raft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)). The NLRB declined to assert
jurisdiction over the construction industry under the original Wagner Act, ch. 372, §§ 1-19, 49
Stat. 449 (1935), without explaining its reasons. Johns-Manville Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 1 (1945). See
also In re Brown & Root, Inc., 51 N.L.R.B. 820 (1943). After Taft-Hartley, the Board responded
to the express intent of Congress, see S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947), by taking
jurisdiction over construction-industry cases. Plumbing Contractors Ass'n, 93 N.L.R.B. 1081
(1951). See also Fleming, supra note 5, at 702-03.
28. See Fleming, The Building Trades and Title VII of LMRDA, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AcT OF 1959 at 1032 (R. Slovenko ed.
1961). Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the construction industry had typically hired through hiring
halls run by the construction unions. Id. 1035-36. This practice enabled the unions to ensure that
all employees on the job were union members. Congress moved against such "closed shops" in
Taft-Hartley, and provided that union-security agreements-agreements requiring that an em-
ployee join a union--could not require an employee to join a union until he had been working for
30 days. Pub. L. No. 80-101 § 8(a), 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976)).
In the construction industry, however, many jobs last less than 30 days. Fleming, supra, at 1036.
The Board was therefore constantly faced with union subterfuges to avoid Taft-Hartley, and its
efforts to enforce the Act were generally frustrated. Id. In 1956 the Board clamped down and
required a union to reimburse dues collected under an illegal closed-shop agreement. Plumbers
Local 231 (Brown-Olds Plumbing & Heating Corp.), 115 N.L.R.B. 594, 597 (1956) (a closed-shop
agreement that required the employer not to hire a person unless the union referred him was held
unlawful). The use of this remedy generated so much controversy that it was suspended until
[Vol. 1981:141
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NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council29 high-
lighted one such problem. In Denver Building Trades a general con-
tractor awarded an electrical subcontract to a subcontractor who
employed nonunion labor. Other subcontractors on the site, as well as
the general contractor, were union firms. The union workers picketed
to protest the presence of nonunion workers on the site. Giving in to
the pressure, the general contractor terminated the employment of the
nonunion subcontractor. 30 The subcontractor then filed unfair labor
practice charges with the NLRB. The Board found that the unions had
used unlawful secondary pressure against a neutral employer--the gen-
eral contractor-with the object of influencing the labor policies of the
nonunion subcontractor. The Board therefore ordered the unions to
cease and desist from the unlawful picketing. 31 The Supreme Court
agreed with the Board, holding that the picketing constituted secondary
pressure in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.32
In construing the Taft-Hartley Act to prohibit common-situs pick-
eting,33 the Denver Building Trades Court rejected the argument that all
employees on a construction site work for the general contractor. 34 The
Court noted that the general contractor brings the subcontractor onto
the site and supervises his work, but considered it well settled that the
two are independent contractors. 35 Pressure on the general contractor
to influence labor policies of the subcontractor thus breaches the anti-
secondary provisions of the Act.36 In dissent, Justice Douglas argued
1958. Fleming, supra, at 1036. In 1959 Congress attempted to adjust the labor laws to construc-
tion industry bargaining practices by enacting section 8(f), which legalized prehire agreements.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-
257, § 705(a), 73 Stat. 543 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976)).
29. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
30. Id. at 677-79.
31. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 82 N.L.R.B. 1195 (1949).
32. 341 U.S. at 689.
33. Id. at 689-90. Common-situs picketing occurs when one union pickets at a multi-em-
ployer construction site, thus inducing members of all unions at the site to walk off the job. See
Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction Industry, 60 YALE
L.J. 673 (1951).
34. 341 U.S. at 689-90.
35. Id.
36. During the Senate debate on the conference report accompanying the Landrum-Griffin
Act, Senator Morse criticized the Denver Building Trades decision for neglecting the close relation-
ship between contractors and subcontractors on a construction site. 105 CONG. REc. 17,881 (1959)
(remarks of Sen. Morse), reprinted in II LEGIs. HIST., supra note 4, at 1425. Unlike the true
neutral employers that the secondary-boycott restrictions were designed to protect, the
general contractor is, in effect, entirely in control of the kind of labor relations taking
place on ajob site which he runs. He lets subcontracts based on price, responsibility, and
the ability to handle labor relations.
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that common-situs picketing does not constitute secondary activity.3 7
Common-situs picketing, he stated, reflects only the traditional union
demand that "union men not be compelled to work alongside nonun-
ion men on the same job. '38 The unions picketed because the general
contractor brought nonunion workers on the job site; that a subcontrac-
tor was the means of accomplishing this was immaterial.
The failure of Denver Building Trades to accommodate the interest
of unionized construction workers in working on an all-union site did
not end union efforts to attain that goal. Denver Building Trades settled
that secondary pressure tactics violate Taft-Hartley. Yet voluntary
agreements between unions and employers to restrict subcontracting to
union firms appeared to be lawful under Local 1976, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door).39
In SandDoor two general contractors entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners. The agreement provided that the carpenters need not work on
material produced by nonunion workers.40 Despite the agreement, the
general contractors purchased doors from the Sand Door and Plywood
Company, a distributor of nonunion doors. When union representa-
tives discovered this, they directed union members to stop working.
Sand Door filed charges alleging that the carpenters had exerted pres-
sure against it to prevent it from doing business with the nonunion
manufacturer; the carpenters raised the hot-cargo contract as a de-
fense.41
The Court held that an employer's voluntary agreement not to
purchase doors made by a nonunion company could not be enforced by
coercive union tactics.42 The hot-cargo agreement itself, however, did
The Board and the Supreme Court, in the Denver Building Trades case, held that
this very unified relationship was a group of separate employers; hence, a primary dis-
pute with one of them would have to be conducted in a way not to induce the employees
of the other contractors on the job to refrain from work. This case ...involved an
electrical contractor paying 42 cents an hour below the negotiated area rate. That such a
subcontractor was on the job at all was directly due to a decision by the general contrac-
tor, and it is difficult to see how a union inducement of his employees to leave work can
be justly prohibited ....
Id.
37. 341 U.S. at 692 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
40. Id. at 95.
41. Id. at 94-96.
42. Id. at 104-05. The Court reasoned that the secondary boycott provisions prohibited only
coercive secondary pressure. Hence, a voluntary agreement by an employer did not violate the
Act. If an employer did not honor a voluntary agreement, however, the element of voluntariness
ceased. Union action at that point contravened the policy against involuntary cessations of doing
[Vol. 1981:141
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not constitute illegal secondary activity. 43 Sand Door thus enabled un-
ions to enter into agreements with employers to influence the labor pol-
icies of other employers.44 A union could attain through an agreement
exactly what Denver Building Trades declared it could not achieve
through pressure: it could prevent a general contractor from employing
nonunion subcontractors. This arrangement satisfied neither construc-
tion unions nor employers. The unions wanted to eliminate the ban on
common-situs picketing;45 the employers sought an additional ban on
secondary subcontracting agreements.46 Congress addressed these mat-
ters when it amended the Act by passing the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959, popularly known as the Landrum-
Griffin Act.47
B. The Genesis of the Construction Industry Proviso to Section 8(e).
The Landrum-Griffin Act combines two distinct types of provi-
sions.48 One group of sections regulates the internal affairs of unions to
promote union democracy.49 A second set, amending the Taft-Hartley
Act,50 tightens Taft-Hartley's restrictions on organized labor's activi-
ties.51 Section 8(e)52 is of the second type. The aim of section 8(e),
which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization and an
employer to agree not to do business with a third person, is to outlaw
secondary agreements.5 3
business with another person to influence that person's labor relations. The Court therefore mea-
sured freedom of choice at the time the protested union action occurred. Id.
43. Id. at 108.
44. Although Sand Door actually dealt with a product-boycott agreement, both the Court
and the Board have acknowledged that Sand Door applied generally to secondary agreements.
See NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 516 (1977) ("[Tlhe making and volun-
tary observance of [hot cargo] contracts were not contrary to law at the time that Sand Door was
decided"); Metropolitan Dist. Council, 149 N.L.R.B. 646, 658 (1964) (discussing "the then-lawful
'hot-cargo' clause in the Sand Door case").
45. See Note, TheAntitrust Exemptionfor Labor Organizations in the Construction Industry, 2
WHrrrIER L. REv. 285, 289-90 (1980).
46. See Fleming, supra note 5, at 682.
47. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. II
1978)).
48. See generally Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (pts.
1-2), 73 HARV. L. REv. 851, 1086 (1960).
49. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, tits. I-IV, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (1959) (current version codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
50. Id., tit. VII (current version codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
51. See C. MoRRIs, supra note 7, at 51-54; Cox, The Landrum-Grifi Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 260 (1959).
52. The text of section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), is set out in note 7 supra.
53. The Supreme Court had implied that secondary agreements were lawful in Local 1976,
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958). See notes 39-44 supra and
accompanying text.
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Congress prohibited secondary agreements principally because
they enmesh a neutral employer in a labor struggle between a union
and the primary employer.54 But the neutral (secondary) employer is
not the only person the secondary agreement influences; the agreement
also affects the employees of the primary employer. By threatening the
primary employer with the loss of business if it does not recognize the
union, secondary agreements tend to organize from the top down.55
Rather than appealing directly to the workers to form a union, top-
down organizing imposes the union on both the workers and their em-
ployer, depriving the workers of their right to choose or refrain from
choosing a bargaining representative. 56 As a practical matter, once the
employer recognizes the union, all the employees may be forced to sub-
mit to that union's representation. 57 Section 8(e) was part of Congress's
scheme to limit top-down organizing.58 The scheme not only restricted
hot-cargo contracts, but also regulated primary recognitional picket-
ing59 and proscribed secondary economic pressure.60
The Senate originally proposed that section 8(e) cover only the
transportation industry, in response to the Teamsters Union's notorious
54. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612,635-38 (1967). The National
Woodwork Manufacturers Court stated that both section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B)
(1976), and section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (e) (1976), were designed to insulate neutral secondary
employers from pressure to boycott a primary employer. 386 U.S. at 635.
55. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975).
56. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), secures this right.
Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized m sec-
tion 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id.
57. The Act authorizes union-security agreements that require an employee in a union shop
to join the union within thirty days of his employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). In the
construction industry, section 8(f) permits this period to be shortened to seven days. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(f) (1976). State right-to-work laws, however, may prohibit union-security agreements. 29
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
58. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975).
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976). A union may picket an employer with the object of
compelling that employer to recognize the union. Although this picketing is primary, it still may
constitute top-down organizing because the employer may recognize the union, without regard for
the employees' wishes, in order to end the picketing. Cf. Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354
U.S. 284 (1957) (the Court upheld a state court injunction against a union's picketing for recogni-
tion, when the picketing was designed to influence the employer to pressure his employees to join
the union).
60. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(B), 159(c) (1976).
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use of hot-cargo agreements. 6' The Teamsters had used their control
over the trucking industry to win agreements entitling them to refuse to
handle goods of nonunion manufacturers. Because these manufactur-
ers depended on the trucking industry to transport their products, the
Teamsters could exert pressure on them to recognize Teamsters lo-
cals.62 The House, however, saw a broader evil in secondary agree-
ments, and countered with a sweeping condemnation of secondary
agreements in all industries.63 In conference the House version of sec-
tion 8(e) prevailed, but the Senate insisted on an exception for the con-
struction industry and an even broader exception for the garment
industry.64 The construction industry proviso states:
Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement
between a labor organization and an employer in the construction
industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a
building, structure, or other work .... 65
Few legislators spoke on the construction industry proviso, and the re-
marks of those who did were brief. The NLRB and the courts have
thus looked to the general structure of the labor laws as well as to the
legislative history for guidance in interpreting the proviso.
C. Pre-Connell Interpretations of the Proviso.
Three developments in the interpretation of section 8(e) preceded
the Supreme Court's Connell decision. The courts at first uniformly
rejected the NLRB's narrow construction of the proviso and eventually
persuaded the Board to adopt a broader view of it. Courts then began
to limit the contours of the proviso, finding that the Board's interpreta-
tion went beyond the purposes Congress had for the proviso. Finally,
the Supreme Court decided a major section 8(e) case, in the course of
61. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 707(a) (1959), reprinted in I LEGIs. HIsT., supra note 4, at
582. As originally proposed, the subsection read:
(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
who is a common carrier subject to Part I1 of the Interstate Commerce Act to enter into
any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains
or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, or transporting any of the products of
any other employer or to cease doing business with the same.
Id. On the original motivation of the Senate to reach only the Teamsters with its prohibition of
hot-cargo clauses, see National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 636 (1967); S. REP.No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprinted in I LEis. HIST., supra note 4, at 475.
62. See S. REp. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprinted in I LEros. HIsT., supra note 4, at
474, 475.
63. See H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. § 705(b)(1) (1959), reprinted in I LEGis. HIST., supra
note 4, at 683.
64. See CONF. COMM. REP., H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 39-40 (1959), reprinted
in I LEois. HIsT., supra note 4, at 934, 943-44.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
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which the Court touched on the purposes of the construction industry
proviso.66
The first development concerned the Board's initial reluctance to
permit unions to pressure employers to accept subcontracting agree-
ments that the construction industry proviso concededly protected. 67
Section 8(b)(4)(A) 68 makes it an unfair labor practice to compel an em-
ployer to enter into an agreement prohibited by section 8(e). The
Board found that section 8(b)(4)(A) and 8(e) combined to prohibit
union pressure for subcontracting agreements.69 This analysis rested
on the view that Congress intended to permit only voluntary subcon-
tracting agreements.70 Three courts of appeals rejected this view, hold-
ing that section 8(b)(4)(A) prohibited pressure to obtain secondary
agreements proscribed by section 8(e) but did not reach lawful secon-
dary agreements such as those shielded by the construction industry
proviso.71 In 1964 the Board acceded to this view. In Northeastern In-
diana Building and Construction Trades Council (Centlivre Village Apart-
ments) ,72 the Board recognized that the congressional scheme
governing construction industry subcontracting allowed unions to use
economic pressure to secure agreements protected by the proviso.
After Centlivre the Board began to construe the proviso expansively.73
The second step in defining the scope of the proviso was taken
when courts were asked to determine the meaning of "job site" work.
By its terms the construction industry proviso protects only those agree-
ments between unions and employers that relate to work on a construc-
tion site.74 In Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB 75 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held unlawful an agreement between a
66. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
67. See Construction, Prod., & Maintenance Laborers Local 383 (Colson & Stevens Constr.
Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1650 (1962), enforcement denied, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
68. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976).
69. See Construction, Prod., & Maintenance Laborers Local 383 (Colson & Stevens Constr.
Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1650 (1962), enforcement denied, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
70. Id.
71. See Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1964); Or-
ange Belt Dist. Council v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Construction, Prod., & Mainte-
nance Laborers Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
72. 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964), enforcement denied on other grounds, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
73. See Plumbers Local 100 (Hagler Constr. Co.), NLRB Case No. 16-CC-447 (May 1, 1974).
The General Counsel's memorandum supporting his decision not to issue a complaint against
Plumbers Local 100 is reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 298 (1974).
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). The text of the proviso is set out at text accompanying
note 65 supra. "The proviso does not exempt from section 8(e) agreements relating to supplies or
other products or materials shipped or otherwise transported and delivered on the site of construc-
tion." CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 64, at 39, reprinted in I LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4, at 943.
75. 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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union and an employer that permitted the employees to honor a secon-
dary picket line.76 Because this amounted to an authorization of a sec-
ondary strike, it fell within section 8(e). The union, which represented
truck drivers transporting ready-mix concrete, argued that the con-
struction industry proviso sheltered the agreement. This contention re-
quired the court to determine whether Congress intended the job-site
limitation in the proviso to cover suppliers of concrete. To answer this
question the court examined the proviso's purposes.77 The court con-
cluded that "the purpose of the section 8(e) proviso was to alleviate the
frictions that may arise when union men work continuously alongside
nonunion men on the same construction site."' 78 Because drivers deliv-
ering concrete worked only briefly on the construction site, the friction
feared by Congress would not develop. Hence, the proviso did not le-
gitimate the agreement. The significance of Drivers Local 695 is that it
saw a single purpose for the proviso: the avoidance of job-site fric-
tion.79
The final pre-Connell development was the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB.8° In
National Woodwork Manufacturers, a general contractor had an agree-
ment with the Carpenters International Union that union carpenters
did not have to handle prefitted doors. Although the contractor's job
specifications did not require prefitted doors, it obtained them anyway.
Upon the carpenters' refusal to hang the doors, the contractor acquired
doors to be fitted on the job site. The National Woodwork Manufac-
turer's Association then filed unfair labor practice charges against the
union with the NLRB, alleging that the refusal-to-handle clause vio-
76. The court construed the agreement as sanctioning a secondary boycott against the pri-
mary employer. Id. at 549. This situation would arise when a union that has a dispute with a
subcontractor pickets a general contractor to induce him not to do business with the subcontractor.
If the general contractor does not discipline his employees when they refuse to cross the picket
line, he has in effect authorized a secondary boycott.
77. Id. at 552.
78. Id. at 553.
79. The Drivers Local 695 court's analysis of the proviso did not depend on a reading of the
legislative history; rather, the court relied on Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council v. NLRB, 332
F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1964); Justice Douglas's dissent in NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951); and two law review comments: Comment, TheLandrum-GrIffn
Amendment: Labor's Use of the Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 724 (1960); Comment, Hot
Cargo Agreements Under the National Labor Relations Act: Analysis of Section 8(e), 38 N.Y.U. L.
Rv. 97 (1963). Alternative reasons for the proviso, such as a desire to preserve a pattern of
collective bargaining, were not discussed despite statements indicating such a policy by Senator
John Kennedy, the proponent of the proviso. See 105 CONG. Rc. 17,899 (1959) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy), reprinted in II LEGIs. HisT., supra note 4, at 1432. See also Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 628-29 (1975) (dismissing such remarks as "bare references").
80. 386 U.S. 612 (1967). Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion. Justice Stewart, joined
by three other justices, dissented. See 386 U.S. at 650 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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lated section 8(e).8' The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ac-
cepted this contention82 but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
section 8(e) proscribed only secondary agreements.8 3 Agreements that
restricted subcontracting solely to protect the jobs of union members
were primary agreements, because they aimed to preserve the work of
the bargaining unit. The Court thus upheld the union's refusal-to-han-
dle clause.84
Although National Woodwork Manufacturers did not involve the
construction industry proviso, the Court drew upon it to support the
conclusion that section 8(e) prohibited only secondary agreements.85
The Court construed the proviso as "a measure designed to allow
agreements pertaining to certain secondary activities on the construc-
tion site because of the close community of interests there .... "86
The Court illuminated the meaning of "close community of interests"
by citing a case that interpreted the proviso as a grant to construction
unions "in recognition of. .. sporadic work stoppages occasioned by
the traditional refusal of craft unionists to work alongside non-union
men on the same project." 87 The Court also cited a law review com-
ment that spelled out the need for all crafts on a job to act collectively
in order to compel the general contractor not to subcontract to non-
union firms. 88
81. Id. at 615-16.
82. 354 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1965), rei'd, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
83. The Court stated that secondary agreements can be identified by considering:
whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union's objective was preserva-
tion of work for [the contracting employer's] employees, or whether the agreements...
were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere. . . . The touchstone is
whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the relations of the contracting
employer vis-i4-vis his own employees.
386 U.S. at 644-45 (footnotes omitted).
84. Id. at 646; Gf. NLRB v. Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507 (1977) (the union violated the
secondary boycott prohibitions of section 8(b)(4) by picketing a subcontractor in order to enforce
a valid primary work-preservation agreement, when the general contractor and not the subcon-
tractor had the sole right to control the assignment of the work that the union sought).
85. 386 U.S. at 639. The construction industry proviso's job-site limitation indicated to the
Court that section 8(e) prohibits only secondary agreements. The Court reasoned that the legisla-
tive history does not suggest that Congress intended to allow construction unions to protect their
work against job-site prefabrication but not against off-job-site prefabrication. These difficulties
disappear if the body of section 8(e) is read to prohibit only secondary agreements, and the pro-
viso is read to permit secondary agreements in relation to the job site, where construction unions
have a special interest in restricting employment to union members. Id. at 637-39.
86. Id. at 638-39.
87. Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 640 (3d Cir. 1964) (a
strike to obtain an agreement lawful under section 8(e) does not violate section 8(b)(4)(A)), citedin
386 U.S. at 639 n.32.
88. See Comment, supra note 33, at 684-89, citedin 386 U.S. at 639 n.32.
With employers numerous, employment of short duration, and individual craft unity
small on any one project, unions have traditionally been forced to rely on the coopera-
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The net effect of these developments was that the Board adopted a
broad reading of the construction industry proviso, which the courts
began to narrow to accord with the perceived congressional intent of
preserving job-site harmony. These two views clashed in Connell Con-
struction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100.89
II. CONNELL CONSTRUCTION Co. V. PLUMBERS LOCAL 100
A. The Facts and Holding of Connell.
The Connell case arose out of a campaign mounted by the Plumb-
ers and Steamfitters Union to be recognized as the representative of
employees of the mechanical subcontractors in the Dallas area. Rather
than approach the employees directly, the Plumbers adopted a rela-
tively novel tactic designed to organize from the top down.90 They
sought an agreement with the general contractors in the Dallas area,
including Connell, that the general contractors would subcontract work
within the trade jurisdiction of the Plumbers only to subcontractors
that recognized Plumbers Local 100. The Plumbers did not intend to
represent the general contractors' own employees. In fact, the Plumb-
ers presented the proposed agreement only to general contractors who
did not employ workers within the Plumbers' trade jurisdiction. In or-
der to induce Connell to sign the agreement, a single representative of
the Plumbers picketed a Connell job site. After 150 workers walked off
the job, Connell gave in and signed the agreement. He then sued to
void the agreement on antitrust grounds. The union raised the defense
that the construction industry proviso authorized the agreement.91
tion of all workers on a job in order to bring pressure on any particular employer. Thus
where one subcontractor refuses to hire union men, the spumed union pickets the entire
project to induce the union employees of other subcontractors on the job to walk out.
This in turn is designed to compel the general contractor to sever relations with the non-
union subcontractor.
Comment, supra note 33, at 688.
89. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
90. The tactic the Plumbers used in Connell was not their first attempt to organize the
mechanical subcontractors. An earlier case, Dallas Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 396
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968), dealt with the Trade Council's picketing of general contractors in Dal-
las to obtain subcontracting agreements. Because the general contractors had a collective bargain-
ing agreement with some of the constituent crafts of the Trades Council, the court held that the
picketing was recognitional, and that it therefore violated section 8(b)(7) because it interfered with
the representation of the general contractors' employees by another union. The court hinted, how-
ever, that a union could avoid the section 8(b)(7) issue by picketing a general contractor who did
not employ members of the picketing union's craft. 396 F.2d at 682 n.8. This suggestion resulted
in the picketing held unlawful in Connell. St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of
Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REv. 603, 625-26 (1976). Professor St. Antoine described this as a "rela-
tively novel organizational tactic." Id. 628.
91. 421 U.S. at 618-21. Connell originally filed suit in state court, alleging that the agreement
violated Texas antitrust law. The Plumbers removed the action to federal court; Connell then
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The Supreme Court held that the agreement fell outside of the
proviso, and that the Plumbers therefore could not use the proviso as a
defense against an antitrust suit.92 Justice Powell, for the majority, 93
construed the construction industry proviso as extending "only to
agreements in the context of collective bargaining relationships and, in
light of congressional references to the Denver Building Trades prob-
lem, possibly to common-situs relationships on particular job sites as
well."94 Because the Plumbers did not have a collective bargaining re-
lationship with Connell and because the subcontracting agreement was
not limited to particular job sites, the Court held that the proviso did
not apply to the agreement. 95
The Court first looked to legislators' statements about the purpose
of the proviso in order to determine its scope. The Connell Court
found the sparse legislative explanations for the proviso unenlighten-
ing. The legislative history states that the proviso was intended "to pre-
serve the pattern of collective bargaining in the industry," but the
gave in and signed the agreement under protest. Id. at 620. In federal court Connell amended its
complaint to allege a Sherman Act violation. The union defended on grounds of statutory and
nonstatutory exemptions from the antitrust laws, and also claimed that the agreement was privi-
leged by the construction industry proviso to section 8(e). The district court, siding with the
union, held the agreement to be within the bounds of the proviso and, therefore, beyond the reach
of the antitrust laws. Id. at 621.
In affirming the district court, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th
Cir. 1973), aj'd inpart and rev'd in part, 421 U.S. 618 (1975), took another path. The agreement
aimed at a legitimate labor interest: eliminating competition over wages. As a result, the subcon-
tracting restraint enjoyed a nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws. See 483 F.2d at
1167-69. The court declined to decide whether the proviso extended to subcontracting agreements
made outside of a collective bargaining context, believing that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdic-
tion over labor law questions. Id. at 1167-71, 1175.
92. For a discussion of the antitrust implications of Connell, see St. Antoine, supra note 90.
See also Casey & Cozzillio, Labor-Antitrust: TheProblems ofConnell anda Remedy That Follows
Naturally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235.
93. Four justices dissented, arguing that if the Plumbers' agreement fell outside the protec-
tion of the proviso, the labor laws provided an exclusive remedy. The dissenters did not reach the
section 8(e) proviso issue. See 421 U.S. at 638 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. (Stewart, J., joined by
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 633 (majority opinion). The Denver Building Trades problem refers to union pick-
eting at a multi-employer construction site to remove a nonunion subcontractor. See notes 29-38
supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, Hot Cargo Agreements in the Construction In-
dustry: The Effect of Acco Equipment, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 1292, 1298-99 (1974).
95. 421 U.S. at 633. The Court also held that the Plumbers could not avail themselves of
either statutory or nonstatutory exemptions from the antitrust laws. Because neither the labor
laws nor the labor exemptions from the antitrust laws provided a defense, the Court held that the
Plumbers were not immune from suit under the Sherman Act. Id. at 635. Connell filed an anti-
trust suit, rather than charges with the NLRB, because the Board at that time considered subcon-
tracting agreements like the one the Plumbers presented to be valid under section 8(e). See note
15 supra and accompanying text.
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Connell Court dismissed these remarks as "bare references. ' 96 Even if
construction unions had formerly employed top-down organizing, the
Court found it unlikely that Congress intended to foster such activity in
light of the Landrum-Griffin Act's aim of limiting top-down organiz-
ing.97
Instead, the Court viewed the construction industry proviso as "a
partial substitute for an attempt to overrule" the Denver Building
Trades decision. 98 The Conference Committee had added the con-
struction industry proviso to section 8(e) but had failed to add a provi-
sion that would overrule Denver Building Trades and thereby permit
common-situs picketing. 99 The Connell Court considered the common-
situs picketing issue and the subcontracting agreement issue to be inter-
related; it therefore read congressional discussion of the common-situs
problem as relevant to the secondary agreement issue. °0 In the Court's
view, both subcontracting agreements and common-situs picketing aim
at avoiding the simultaneous presence of union and nonunion workers
on the same job site. The construction industry proviso was designed
to meet this aim, not to permit top-down organizing.
The Court buttressed this analysis by examining the interplay of
the two provisos to section 8(e). The construction industry proviso does
not permit construction unions to enforce subcontracting agreements
by strikes and picketing. 01 This limitation contrasts with the broad
freedom to organize given to garment industry unions, which can en-
force their subcontracting agreements through economic action.10 2 The
96. 421 U.S. at 628.
97. Id. at 632.
98. Id. at 629. See note 94 supra. Denver Building Trades had held that union picketing at a
construction site for the purpose of removing a nonunion subcontractor was unlawful. See notes
29-38 supra and accompanying text.
99. See 105 CoNG. REc. 16,263, 16,416-18 (1951), reprinted in II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4,
at 1396-97, 1434-36. Senator John Kennedy attempted to add such a provision but House mem-
bers indicated that they would protest this action because it was a new matter that had not previ-
ously been considered by either house of Congress. Id.
100. 421 U.S. at 629. The Court noted that
[d]iscussion of "special problems" in the construction industry, applicable to both the
section 8(e) proviso and the attempt to override Denver Building Trades, focused on the
problems of picketing a single nonunion subcontractor on a multiemployer building pro-
ject, and the close relationship between contractors and subcontractors at the job site.
Id. at 629-30.
101. The construction industry proviso does not exempt construction unions from section
8(b)(4)(B), which prohibits secondary strikes and boycotts. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). Moreover,
Congress specifically stated that secondary subcontracting agreements in the construction industry
were not enforceable through economic action. See CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 64, at 39,
reprinted in I LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 943; 105 CONG. REc. 16,415 (1959), reprinted in II
LEGIs. HIsT., supra note 4, at 1433.
102. The garment industry proviso, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), permits garment unions both to
make and to enforce secondary agreements. See II LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 1377, 1385, 1576,
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comparison between the construction and garment industry provisos
suggested to the Court that Congress did not intend the construction
industry proviso to shelter agreements designed to organize from the
top down. 103
Finally, the Court noted that the 1959 amendments reinforced the
policy against top-down organizing by establishing "careful limits on
the economic pressure unions may use in aid of the organizational
campaigns." 1 4 The Court found it inconsistent with this general
scheme to suggest that Congress intended to give construction unions
an unrestricted right to engage in secondary organizational activity.
Congress did give special consideration to the construction industry in
section 8(f), which authorizes prehire agreements.10 5 Section 8(f) per-
mits an employer to recognize a union before the union has attained
majority status, even before the employees have been hired. These
1708, for discussion of the reasons behind the garment industry exemption. The garment industry
was characterized by jobbers who contracted garment work out to small shops. These shops were
"fiercely competitive, constantly changing and difficult to organize." Id. 1385 (remarks of Sen.
Javits). Sweatshop conditions thus prevailed. Because secondary subcontracting agreements had
relieved these conditions, Congress wanted to preserve their lawfulness. See also Danielson v.
Joint Bd. of Coat Workers, 494 F.2d 1230 (2d Cir. 1974) (a garment union may lawfully impose an
agreement on ajobber not to contract out to nonunion shops, even if the union and the jobber had
no collective bargaining agreement).
103. 421 U.S. at 632.
104. Id. at 633. The limits on organizational pressure sought to shield both employer and
employee from an undesired union. See id. at 632 n. 11. Congress limited secondary pressure by
enacting section 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976), "which restricts primary recognitional pick-
eting," and by tightening section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976), "which prohibits the
use of most secondary tactics in organizational campaigns." 421 U.S. at 632.
105. 421 U.S. at 633. Section 8(f) provides:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section
for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an
agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be en-
gaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which
building and construction employees are members (not established, maintained, or as-
sisted by any action defined in subsection (a) of this section as an unfair labor practice)
because (1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been established under
the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of such agreement, or (2)
such agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organ-
ization after the seventh day following the beginning of such employment or the effective
date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to
notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or
gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such em-
ployment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or experience qualificationsfor employment or provides for priority in ojpportuniies for employment based upon
length of service with such employer, in the industry or in the particular geographical
area: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall set aside the final proviso to subsec-tion (a)(3) of this section: P"rovidedfurher, That any agreement which would be invalid,
but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to
section 159(c) or 159(e) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1976). The Supreme Court has held that a union may not enforce an 8(f)
bargaining relationship until the union achieves majority support in the bargaining unit. NLRB
v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
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agreements, however, may be challenged in a representation election10 6
to preserve the employees' right to choose or decline representation.
Hence, section 8(f) affords only limited organizing leverage to construc-
tion unions.
The Connell Court therefore concluded that to uphold a subcon-
tracting agreement that was obtained outside of a collective bargaining
context and was not narrowly directed to the common-situs problem
would undermine the anti-secondary provisions of the labor laws and
the right of employees to choose a representative freely. 10 7
B. Connell Reexamined.
1. The Tension Between Connells A4na~ysis and the Language of
its Holding. The language of Connell's holding conflicts with the
Court's view of the proviso's purpose. Connell indicated that either of
two conditions might have brought the Plumbers' subcontracting agree-
ment within the ambit of the proviso: a collective bargaining context or
a restriction to particular job sites.'08 Yet earlier in the opinion the
Court analyzed the proviso as a measure to authorize secondary agree-
ments pertaining to the construction site because of the "close commu-
nity of interests" there, or for the "even narrower function" of avoiding
job-site friction. 0 9 The Court also linked the proviso to efforts to re-
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1976).
107. 421 U.S. at 631-33.
108. The Court stated these two conditions both in defining the scope of the construction
industry proviso, 421 U.S. at 633, and in announcing the holding of the case, id. at 635. Professor
St. Antoine has suggested that these conditions constitute two logically alternative tests for the
validity of a subcontracting clause; however, "the Connell opinion is not clear on these points."
St. Antoine, supra note 90, at 619 n.74. Peter Nash, the Board's General Counsel when Connell
was decided, recently expressed the view that both conditions must be met in order for an agree-
ment to satisfy the construction industry proviso. See Nash, supra note 2, at 674. For the same
opinion, see Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB,
609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),peitionfor rehearing en banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19,
1980).
A close reading of Connell, however, refutes Nash's view. The language of the holding im-
plies alternative conditions. See text accompanying note 94 supra. Furthermore, if the proviso
aims only at avoiding job-site friction, as Nash argues, the dual restriction runs counter to Con-
gress's intent. For instance, the employees of a union subcontractor on a job site have the same
interest in seeing that the general contractor does not subcontract to nonunion firms as do the
general contractor's own employees. Under Nash's view, however, unions representing the sub-
contractor's employees could not sign a subcontracting agreement with the general contractor be-
cause the subcontractors employees have no collective bargaining relationship with the general
contractor. Here, the bargaining relationship requirement serves no purpose but to frustrate un-
ions in their effort to secure an all-union job site.
109. 421 U.S. at 630-31. The court quoted National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386
U.S. 612, 638-39 (1967), for the "close community of interests" language. The "even narrower
function" had been expressed in Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Although the Court described the policy of avoiding job-site friction as narrower than the policy
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verse Denver Building Trades, thus implying that the proviso extended
only to common-situs agreements." 0 If the proviso's purpose is to pro-
tect agreements that prevent common-situs friction, a valid subcon-
tracting agreement must be restricted to particular sites where union
members are working; the presence or absence of a collective bargain-
ing agreement should be irrelevant. The Court failed, however, to ad-
dress this problem.
2. The Purpose of the Construction Industry Proviso. If Connell's
interpretation of the proviso as a measure to relieve job-site conffict is
correct, the language of the holding sweeps too broadly. But the
Court's interpretation is open to question. First, the cases that Connell
relied on to explain the proviso had addressed different issues than the
one facing the Connell Court.'' Second, the legislative history of the
proviso establishes that Congress sought to preserve a pattern of bar-
gaining as well as to reduce job-site friction.' 12 Finally, the meaning of
job-site friction, which Connell did not explore, has less to do with ac-
tual conflict between union and nonunion workers at the job site than
with the desire of unions to prevent the erosion of union standards and
the loss of union jobs.113
(a) The cases cited by the Connell Court. In presenting its view
of the proviso's purpose, the Court relied on earlier cases that inter-
preted the construction industry proviso. The Court quoted the view
expressed in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v.
NLRB 1 4 that the proviso recognized the "close community of inter-
ests" on a construction site.115 The Connell Court also noted that
"[o]ther courts have suggested that [the proviso] serves an even nar-
rower function. . . 'to alleviate the frictions that may arise when union
men work continuously alongside nonunion men on the same construc-
tion site.'116 This language is drawn from Drivers Local 695 v.
NLRB."I1 In contrast to Connell, neither Drivers Local 695 nor Na-
tional Woodwork Manufacturers involved subcontracting restrictions.
of protecting the close community of interests at the job site, it did not explain the difference
between the two policies. The authorities that National Woodwork Manufacturers relied on indi-
cate that the two policies are the same. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
110. See notes 98-100 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 114-18 infra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 119-25 infra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 132-39 Jnfra and accompanying text.
114. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
115. 421 U.S. at 630 (quoting 386 U.S. at 639).
116. Id. (quoting Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
117. 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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National Woodwork Manufacturers dealt with work-preservation
agreements, and Drivers Local 695 with the meaning of work on a job
site. 1 8 Also unlike Connell, in both cases the union and the employer
did have a collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the earlier deci-
sions did not interpret the purpose of the proviso with respect to sub-
contracting clauses outside a collective bargaining context.
(b) The legislative history of theproviso and the unique features of
the construction industry. The Connell Court's reading of the legislative
history overemphasized the common-situs problem as a factor in the
enactment of the proviso and underemphasized Congress's desire to
preserve construction industry bargaining patterns. Connell cites sev-
eral passages of the legislative history that discuss the common-situs
problem in connection with proposals to exempt the construction in-
dustry from section 8(e). 119 The Court interpreted the passages to
mean that a common impulse lay behind the construction industry pro-
viso and the proposal to overrule Denver Building Trades. 20 It there-
fore termed the proviso "a partial substitute for the attempt to
overrule" that case.' 2 '
Two distinct concerns, however, lay behind the special considera-
tion Congress gave to the construction industry in partially exempting
it from section 8(e). On the one hand, the prohibition against common-
118. National Woodwork Manufacturers concerned primary activity unrelated to organiza-
tional aims. 386 U.S. at 615. See notes 80-84 supra and accompanying text. Drivers Local 695
focused on the distinction between ready-mix concrete deliverers and on-site workers. 361 F.2d at
552-53. Cf. Acco Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1975) (repairmen are
not equivalent to on-site workers).
An additional weakness of these authorities is their failure to consult the legislative history of
the construction industry proviso for guidance. Both National Woodwork Manufacturers and Driv-
ers Local 695 rely solely on Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (3d
Cir. 1964), to support their interpretation of the proviso. Essex County, however, concerned eco-
nomic pressure to obtain a concededly valid proviso agreement. In addition, the Essex County
opinion cites no support from the Board, the courts, or the legislative history for its view of the
proviso. Hence, although apparently basing its analysis of the proviso's purpose on solid prece-
dent, the Connell Court in fact relied on the unsupported dicta of prior cases. Moreover, a case
that found a different purpose for the section 8(e) proviso--the preservation of "the stats quo of
bargaining in the construction industry"-received no mention at all. See Dallas Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. NLRB, 396 F.2d 677, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
119. 421 U.S. at 630 n.9.
120. Id. at 629 n.8. The Court stated: "The Conference Committee proposed to include a
[Denver Buildig Trades] amendment to § 8(b)(4)(B) in the Conference agreement, along with a
closely linked construction industry exemption from § 8(e).. . . But a parliamentary obstacle
killed the § 8(b)(4)(B) amendment, and only the section 8(e) proviso survived." 421 U.S. at 629
n.8. See note 99 supra.
121. 421 U.S. at 629.
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situs picketing inspired legislation to permit such picketing. 122 On the
other hand, concern for the independent bargaining patterns in the
construction industry elicited proposals to preserve these established
patterns. Section 8(f), 123 permitting prehire agreements, was enacted at
the same time as the proviso and shows the legislative recognition of
the unique patterns of bargaining in the industry. The legislative his-
tory thus indicates that the Denver Building Trades problem was not the
sole impetus behind section 8(e). The unique bargaining patterns in
the construction industry were also on the legislators' minds.
Members of both houses of Congress repeatedly asserted that the
proviso to section 8(e) was intended to preserve the current scheme of
union-employer relations in the construction industry. Senator John
Kennedy's Conference Report to the Senate stated that the proviso "is
intended to preserve the present state of the law. . . .Agreements by
which a contractor in the construction industry promises not to subcon-
tract work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear to be
legal today. They will not be unlawful under section 8(e)."' 24 The
House Conference Report agreed.125 Connell thus neglected to recog-
nize that an important purpose of the proviso was to adjust the labor
laws to the special needs of construction unions, including their estab-
lished bargaining patterns.
The construction industry has several unique features126 that un-
derlie section 8(f) and the proviso to section 8(e). First, construction
work lasts only a limited time at a single site.127 Employees are there-
fore constantly changing employers and moving to new job sites. To
represent those workers effectively, unions must be able to bargain with
employers on their behalf even before the workers are hired for a spe-
cific job. 128 Second, to make an accurate bid, the employer needs to
know his labor costs before a job begins. Moreover, he must have
quick access to a pool of workers once the job starts.129 Third, subcon-
122. The various bills that included proposals to overrule the ban on common-situs picketing
are listed in II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4, at 1912-15.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1976).
124. 105 CONG. Rac. 17,900 (1959), reprinted in II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4, at 1433.
125. See CONF. COMM. REP., supra note 44, at 39 (1959), reprinted in I LEolS. HIST., supra
note 4, at 943.
126. See S. RaP. No. 187, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1959), reprinted in I LEGIs. HIST., supra
note 4, at 423.
127. Id See also Fleming, supra note 28, at 1033.
128. This is the type of agreement permitted by section 8(f) of the Landrum-Grifin Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
129. For these reasons, prehire agreements were prevalent in the construction industry even
after the Taft-Hartley Act brought construction workers under the Board's jurisdiction. For evi-
dence of congressional awareness of these features, see S. REt. No. 187, supra note 126, at 28,
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tracting is the norm rather than the exception in the industry. The gen-
eral contractor typically employs many subcontracting firms on the job
site.1 30
The labor laws, designed to promote fair labor practices in manu-
facturing, did not originally take into account these unique features of
construction labor.' 3 ' The requirement that a union obtain majority
support after the employees have been hired, though appropriate in the
manufacturing context, did not fit the construction industry. Similarly,
though the condemnation of hot-cargo contracts shielded neutral em-
ployers in most lines of work, in the construction industry it denied to
unions a tool to ensure that union members would be employed on the
construction site even if the general contractor subcontracted the work
sought by the union. Congress passed section 8(f) and the proviso to
section 8(e) to make the necessary adjustments.
(c) The meaning of "job-site friction." Connell suggested that a
recognition of union solidarity at the job site or the narrower intention
to permit the avoidance of job-site friction caused Congress to adopt
the construction industry proviso.' 32 The Court did not shed much
light on the source of either the solidarity or the friction. Drivers Local
695 v. NLRB, t33 cited by the Court, 34 seems to view the friction as
stemming from hostility between union and nonunion workers. 35 The
legislative history, however, implies that Congress was concerned that
nonunion firms on a project would impair the benefits for workers that
unions had won. Read in light of the legislative history, both the "close
community of interests" language and the reference to avoiding job-site
friction point to a single phenomenon: the solidarity of union members
in refusing to work with nonunion workers because to tolerate nonu-
nion firms on the job site would undermine the union's strength.
reprinted in I LEGis. HIsT., supra note 4, at 424. Section 8(e) proviso agreements were also used in
the construction industry to further the aim of establishing union conditions on job sites. Con-
gress, in passing the proviso, recognized that the proviso was "necessary to avoid serious damage
to the pattern of collective bargaining. 105 CONG. Rc. 17,899 (1959), reprinted in II LEGIS.
HIST., supra note 4, at 1432.
130. See Comment, supra note 94, at 1297.
131. See note 28 supra.
132. 421 U.S. at 630-31.
133. 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
134. See 421 U.S. at 630.
135. The Drivers Local 695 court stressed that the friction occurs between union and nonunion
workers who come into contact "continuously" on a construction site. 361 F.2d at 553. The facts
of NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951), however, suggest that
union workers may not know or be concerned about the presence of nonunion workers on the site
until the union officials make them aware. See id. at 679 (the Trades Council picketed the site of
construction "to notify their members that nonunion men were working on it").
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Twice during the Senate debate on the proposed amendments to
Taft-Hartley, Senators recited the facts of Denver Building Trades136 to
argue that Congress should legislatively overrule the case. Senator
Morse emphasized that the union workers in Denver Building Trades
refused to tolerate a nonunion subcontractor on the site because the
nonunion subcontractor paid forty-two cents an hour less than was
paid to union workers. 137 Senator Carroll repeated this fact, adding
that "[t]he building trades workers-carpenters, bricklayers, and the
rest-said 'we refuse to work alongside them.' "138
These interpretations of Denver Building Trades emphasize that
the protest of union workers against working with nonunion workers
grows out of their concern that the subcontracting of work to nonunion
firms will erode negotiated union standards. To permit a general con-
tractor to subcontract to nonunion firms is to allow him to evade his
collective bargaining obligations. This concern extends not only to job
sites at which the general contractor brings a nonunion subcontractor
together with his own union workers, but also to job sites at which the
general contractor displaces his union employees by subcontracting all
the work to nonunion firms. 139
In sum, the Connell Court's holding gave a broader scope to the
proviso than its analysis of the proviso's purpose suggested was appro-
priate. Moreover, the Court, in stating the purpose of the proviso,
failed to accord sufficient weight to Congress's desire to preserve bar-
gaining patterns, and thus overemphasized the problem of job-site fric-
tion. Finally, although the Court did not discuss what it meant by job-
site friction, it appeared to endorse the view that such frictions exist
between union and nonunion workers. In fact, however, the source of
the tension is the general contractor who invites the nonunion subcon-
tractor onto the site.
The Connell decision forced the National Labor Relations Board
and the courts to choose between incompatible alternatives. If a collec-
tive bargaining relationship protects a subcontracting agreement, as the
holding implies, a union may impose an agreement on employers even
136. 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See notes 29-38 supra and accompanying text.
137. 105 CONG. REc. 16,396 (1959), reprinted in II LFoIS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 1425. See
note 36 supra.
138. 105 CONG. REc. 16,418 (1959), reprinted in II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 4, at 1436.
139. Denver Building Trades involved only a common-situs conflict. See 186 F.2d at 332
(Trades Council employees of the general contractor at other job sites remained on the job), rev'd,
341 U.S. 675 (1951). The court in In re Bullard Contracting Co., 464 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.N.Y.
1979), however, recognized that the job-site conflict might occur precisely when the general con-
tractor subcontracted all job-site work. Id. at 317. See also notes 152-54 infra and accompanying
text.
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though the agreement is not restricted to a particular job site. But if the
proviso shelters only those agreements aimed at common-situs
problems, the restriction to a particular job site is crucial. This uncer-
tainty guaranteed controversy in applying Connell to different factual
settings.
C. The Response of the Board's General Counsel and the Courts to
Connell.
1. The NLRB General Counsel's Comell Memorandum. The
General Counsel's reaction to the Connell decision demonstrated that
the ambiguities of the opinion offered a springboard for a narrow read-
ing of the construction industry proviso. A memo from the General
Counsel, issued in December 1976, fixed policy on when to issue com-
plaints attacking subcontracting clauses under section 8(e) in light of
Connell.t40 According to the General Counsel, Connell requires the
conclusion that the "proviso reflected a Congressional determination
that a construction union has a legitimate interest in assuring that em-
ployees represented by it on a construction site are not required to work
alongside non-union employees on that site"; 141 any subcontracting
agreement broader than necessary to further this interest would not fit
under the proviso.
The memorandum asserted that under Connell a subcontracting
agreement is lawful only if entered into in the context of collective bar-
gaining.142 But to accord with its conception of the proviso's purpose,
the memorandum further required that subcontracting restrictions op-
erate only at particular job sites and only at times when union employ-
140. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at I, reprinted in LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 295 (1976). The General Counsel's memorandum provides guidance on how regional
offices should handle subcontracting agreements under Connell. The regional offices have the
responsibility to issue complaints upon charges filed by an aggrieved party. d I-II, reprinted in
LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 296 (1976).
141. Id. II, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 296 (1976). Under section 3(d) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976), the General Counsel has a responsibility to authorize the issuance of a
complaint if reasonable cause exists to believe that a given practice violates the Act. In light of the
unpredictable development of the law under section 8(e), the General Counsel found it necessary
to consider post-Connell issues carefully and to resolve doubts by issuing complaints in order to
allow the Board and courts to adjudicate the issues. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum,
supra note 14, at VII, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 300 (1976).
142. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at 4, reprinted in LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 297-98 (1976). The memorandum suggested, however, that a union representing a
subcontractor's employees might lawfully agree with the general contractor to confine job-site
subcontracting to union firms even in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement. Id., re-
printed in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 298 (1976). The common-situs relationship would be enough to
place such a clause within the purpose that Connell assigned to the proviso.
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ees would be present. 143 These additional limitations nullify the
language of the Connell holding, which indicated that a collective bar-
gaining relationship alone is enough to bring a subcontracting agree-
ment within the proviso.144
The memorandum also stated that a regional office should issue a
complaint when a subcontracting clause restricts subcontracting to
firms having a bargaining relationship with a specified union rather
than with any union. 145 While noting that Senator Kennedy believed
the construction industry proviso was "necessary to avoid serious dam-
age to the pattern of collective bargaining" in the industry, 46 the Gen-
eral Counsel weighed these remarks against the fact that union-
signatory subcontracting clauses lend themselves to top-down organiz-
ing,147 which Connell had condemned. In addition, the General Coun-
sel questioned whether the pattern of collective bargaining in the
construction industry in 1959 included union-signatory clauses. To de-
termine what bargaining patterns existed in 1959, the General Counsel
examined studies of that year's bargaining agreements and initiated his
own study.148 The evidence gathered by the General Counsel sug-
gested that subcontracting agreements varied widely in 1959. He there-
143. Id. 20, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 312-13 (1976). These limitations ensure that a
subcontracting agreement will protect against shoulder-to-shoulder job-site friction, but will not
become an instrument for top-down organizing.
The memorandum also determined that a section 8(f) agreement is a sufficient collective bar-
gaining relationship under Connell, with certain limitations. First, the clause must not be opera-
tional before employees are hired, because at that point no employees that the union represents
are threatened by the prospect of working on a job site along with nonunion employees. Second,
the operation of the clause must be restricted to times when the represented employees will actu-
ally be at work. The General Counsel further contended that subcontracting restrictions on craft
union members performing work outside the jurisdiction of the bargaining unit were permissible,
because union carpenters have the same interest in working alongside union plumbers and electri-
cians as they do in working with union carpenters. Id 8-9, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 305
(1976).
144. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
145. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at V-VI, reprinted in LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 298-99 (1976).
146. Id. 13, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 308 (1976) (quoting 105 CONG. REc. 17,899
(1976), reprinted in II LEGiS. HIsT., supra note 4, at 1432).
147. See note 10 supra.
148. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at 13-16, reprinted in LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 308-09 (1976). The General Counsel reviewed Lunden, Subcontracting Clauses in Ma-
jor Contracts, 84 MONTHLY LAB. RV. 579-86, 715-23 (1961). The General Counsel's own study
evaluated contracts on file at the Department of Labor, and contracts provided by the AFL-CIO.
NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, .supra note 14, at 14, reprinted in LAB. REL. YEARBOOK
309 (1976).
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fore concluded that Congress could not have intended to preserve this
"mosaic."1 49
By concentrating on the purposes Connell attributed to the pro-.
viso, the General Counsel's memorandum read out of the Connell
opinion the "context of a collective bargaining relationship" language
that was central to the Court's holding. Furthermore, the General
Counsel accepted the job-site friction rationale as the only purpose be-
hind the proviso. By jettisoning continuity of bargaining patterns as a
congressional motive, the General Counsel endorsed Connell's narrow
view of the proviso.
2. Court Decisions Interpreting Connell. The district courts con-
sidering Connell's impact divided into two groups. One group empha-
sized the importance of the presence or absence of a collective
bargaining relationship in deciding whether the proviso protects a sub-
contracting clause. 150 The other group stressed the avoidance of job-
site conflict as the determining factor.' 5'
In Orange Belt Council v. Maloney, Inc. ,152 the employer chal-
lenged the validity of a union-signatory subcontracting agreement 153
that was not restricted to particular job sites. In upholding the clause,
the court distinguished Connell on the ground that the union in Connell
did not represent Connell's employees, but the union in the case at bar
did represent Maloney's employees. ' 54 In contrast, Operating Engineers
149. NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum, supra note 14, at 16, reprinted in LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 309 (1976).
150. See notes 152-54 infra and accompanying text.
151. See notes 155-58 infra and accompanying text.
152. 98 L.R.R.M. 3193 (C.D. Cal. 1978), af'don other grounds, 106 L.R.R.M. 2183 (9th Cir.
1980).
153. See note 10 supra.
154. 98 L.R.R.M. at 3194. The court also stated: "I cannot believe that [the employer] effec-
tively could have nullified the proviso by simply making certain that none of his own employees
were on the same job site as the subcontractor's non-union people." Id. The court thus implied
that to create such a rule would encourage an employer to ignore his collective bargaining agree-
ment with the union and subcontract all work at the job site to nonunion firms.
A similar subcontracting clause in a collective bargaining agreement was upheld against an
antitrust attack in In re Bullard Contracting Corp., 464 F. Supp. 312 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). But see
Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368, 1375 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc) (holding ax1 agreement invalid on antitrust grounds because "here there is
neither a collective bargaining relationship. . . nor any evidence of a common-situs problem").
The Federal Trade Commission has also attacked subcontracting agreements on antitrust
grounds. See In re Teamsters Local 959, 93 F.T.C. 739 (1979) (the Teamsters signed a consent
decree agreeing not to enter into subcontracting agreements that extended beyond particular job
sites); Report on Federal Trade Commission Action against the Alaska Teamsters, 138 DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) A-I (July 18, 1978).
For an antitrust counterattack by the construction unions, see California State Council of
Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., No. 77-2323 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 1980) (the
unions' allegation that construction employers had conspired to boycott union subcontracting
firms was held to state a Sherman Act claim).
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v. Neilsen & Co. 155 held a subcontracting agreement unlawful on anti-
trust grounds after rejecting a construction-industry proviso defense.156
The court reasoned that the proviso was designed only to eliminate job-
site friction. Because no union employees were present on the site, the
agreement did not serve this purpose and therefore was void. 57 Simi-
larly, in Long v. Floorcraft Carpet Co. ,158 the court refused to enforce a
subcontracting agreement that operated when union employees were
not present at the site with the subcontractor's nonunion employees.
D. The Board's Post- Connell Decisions.
The Board addressed the post-Connell issues in four cases joined
for argument in 1978.159 These cases required the Board to clarify the
import of the Connell decision for secondary subcontracting agree-
ments. The Board, limiting Connell to its facts, upheld broad subcon-
tracting restrictions within a collective bargaining context and decided
that a prehire agreement under section 8(f) satisfied the collective bar-
gaining requirement.
In Carpenters Local 944 (Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. )160 a
subcontractor and a carpenters local, while renegotiating a collective
bargaining agreement, reached an impasse over whether to retain a
union-signatory subcontracting clause in the new contract.16' The
union then picketed four job sites, stopping work at two of them.
155. 92 L.R.R.M. 2861 (D. Idaho 1975).
156. The court found that the agreement violated the Sherman Act and that the construction
industry proviso did not shield it. Id. at 2863-64.
157. Id.
158. 95 L.R.R.M. 3143 (D. Or. 1977).
159. Carpenters Local 944 (Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc.), 239 N.L.R.B. 241 (1978), en-
forced as mod#fedsub nort Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors,
Inc., v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petition for rehearing en banc granted, No. 78-3469
(9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980); Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Utilities Servs. Eng'g, Inc.),
239 N.L.R.B. 253 (1978); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Donald Schriver, Inc.)
(Sullivan-Kelley & Assocs.), 239 N.L.R.B. 264 (1978), enforcedsub nom. Donald Schriver, Inc. v.
NLRB, 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Operating Eng'rs Local 701 (Pacific Northwest Chapter of
the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.), 239 N.L.R.B. 274 (1978), enforced as mod#ed sub
nom. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 609
F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petition for rehearing en banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19,
1980).
160. 239 N.L.R.B. 241 (1978), enforcedas modfled sub nom. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petition for re-
hearing en banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
161. 239 N.L.R.B. at 241. The contract also contained an alternative subcontracting clause
that purported to meet the requirements of a valid union-standards clause (for a definition of a
union standards clause, see note lOsupra), but the Board found that the terms were so specific that
only an affiliate of the Carpenters could qualify; the alternative clause was therefore equivalent to
a union-signatory subcontracting clause. 239 N.L.R.B. at 247.
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Woelke filed charges under section 8(b)(4)(A). 162
The Board first determined that the subcontracting agreements
had secondary purposes 63 and then held that under Connell the pro-
viso to section 8(e) protects subcontracting agreements in a collective
bargaining context regardless of whether they are limited to particular
job sites.'6 According to the Board, the Connell Court's description of
the proviso's purposes bore only on agreements outside of a collective
bargaining relationship. 65 Connell thus did not require that the Board
disallow a broad subcontracting agreement negotiated within such a
relationship.
In the second case, Operating Engineers Local 701 (Pacific North-
west Chapter of the Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.),166 an en-
gineers' local entered into a collective bargaining agreement with an
association of general contractors. The agreement required all subcon-
tractors to be parties to "an existing labor agreement with the
Union."' 67 The agreement also provided that the parties would arbi-
trate grievances, but that the union could resort to self-help enforce-
ment of the arbitrator's decision.168 A second contractors' association
alleged that the clause violated section 8(e). The Board held that the
162. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976). This section prohibits picketing or threatening to picket
for the purpose of obtaining an agreement that violates section 8(e). Agreements that are lawful
under section 8(e), such as those the proviso protects, are exempt from scrutiny under section
8(b)(4)(A). See Building & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Pressure may thus be used to obtain lawful section 8(e) proviso subcontracting agreements, subject
to certain limits. Construction, Prod. & Maintenance Laborers Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422
(9th Cir. 1963). First, if the aim of the desired agreement is to force the termination of business
relations between the employer and a specific second person, the picketing may violate section
8(b)(4)(B) despite its lawfulness under section 8(b)(4)(A). Second, if the union exerting pressure
seeks a subcontracting clause in the context of recognitional picketing-that is, if the union seeks
not only a subcontracting clause, but agredments about wages, hours, pensions, grievance proce-
dures, union security, working conditions, and health and safety benefits--the picketing is regu-
lated by section 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976). Section 8(b)(7)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(A)
(1976), flatly bans recognitional picketing when the employer has recognized another union; sec-
tion 8(b)(7)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(B) (1976), prohibits all recognitional picketing when a valid
election has been held within one year. In all other cases section 8(b)(7)(C) prohibits recognitional
picketing beyond a reasonable time not to exceed thirty days unless the union files an election
petition with the Board.
163. 239 N.L.R.B. at 247.
164. Id. at 250. The union and the contractor had also reached an impasse over the union's
proposal to include foremen in the bargaining unit. The Board found that the union's attempt to
include supervisors in the collective bargaining unit was an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1976).
165. 239 N.L.R.B. at 249.
166. 239 N.L.R.B. 274 (1978), enforcedas modfed sub nom. Pacific Northwest Chapter of the
Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979),petition for re-
hearing en banc granted, No. 78-3469 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1980).
167. 239 N.L.R.B. at 275.
168. Id.
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self-help enforcement clauses rendered the otherwise lawful subcon-
tracting agreement unlawful. 169 Although the construction industry
proviso protects the subcontracting restraint, section 8(b)(4)(B) 170 pro-
hibits its coercive enforcement.
The third of the four decisions, Los Angeles Building and Construc-
ion Trades Council (Donald Schriver, Inc. ),171 involved the facts of two
cases. In DonaldSchriver17 z an owner-builder, Schriver, had signed an
agreement with the Trades Council under section 8(f),' 73 which permits
recognition of minority unions in the construction industry. At no
time, however, had Schriver employed union members. The agreement
contained both a secondary subcontracting clause and a self-help en-
forcement clause. The Carpenters, an affiliate of the Trades Council,
threatened to picket Schriver to enforce the bargaining agreement, but
no picketing actually occurred. Schriver brought unfair labor practice
charges against the Carpenters, alleging that the agreement violated
section 8(e). In the related case 174 Topaz, a nonunion framing subcon-
tractor, began work on an all-union site. The Carpenters presented To-
paz with the union's standard collective bargaining contract, which
contained a union-signatory subcontracting clause with a self-help en-
forcement provision. Topaz declined to sign a contract that applied
beyond the job site at which he was currently working. The Carpenters
then picketed the job site for ten days. Topaz alleged that the picketing
violated section 8(b)(4)(A) because the subcontracting clause was ile-
gal under section 8(e).
The Board had decided in Woelke & Romero that the construction
industry proviso sheltered subcontracting clauses like the ones involved
in Donald Schriver and Topaz (but for their self-help enforcement pro-
visions) if the clauses were contained in a collective bargaining agree-
ment. 75 The consolidated DonaldSchriver case presented the question
whether a section 8(f) prehire agreement satisfied the collective bar-
gaining requirement. The Board held that it did.176 Congress had en-
acted section 8(f) and the proviso to section 8(e) to harmonize federal
labor policy with the economic reality of the construction industry.
The Board therefore decided to "coordinate" section 8(f) with the pro-
169. Id. at 278.
170. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
171. 239 N.L.R.B. 264 (1978), enforcedsub nom. Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
172. 239 N.L.R.B. at 265-66.
173. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). For the text of section 8(0, see note 105 Supra.
174. 239 N.L.R.B. at 266.
175. See id. at 245-47.
176. Id. at 270.
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viso to section 8(e) and to permit a prehire agreement to support a sub-
contracting restraint. 177 The Board held invalid the self-help
enforcement clauses, however.178
In the fourth case, Colorado Building and Construction Trades
Council (Utilities Services Engineering, Inc. ), 179 a construction contrac-
tor had no collective bargaining agreement with a union. The Trades
Council presented the contractor with a subcontracting proposal, but
did not seek to represent the contractor's employees. 180 Building on the
Woelke & Romero analysis, the Board noted that Connell required ei-
ther of two conditions before an agreement would be permitted under
the construction industry proviso: a bargaining relationship or a com-
mon-situs limitation. 18 1 Here, there was no bargaining relationship be-
tween the Trades Council and the contractor, nor was the agreement
designed to avert common-situs tension. The agreement's operation
was not limited to times when union workers would work alongside
nonunion workers. In addition, the clause permitted union and nonun-
ion workers to be present on the same job site, for it did not restrict the
subcontracting of work in trades other than those represented in the
Trades Council. The Board thus found that the agreement violated
section 8(e). 182
In these four decisions the Board seized on the facts and holding of
Connell rather than concentrating on Connell's statement of the pro-
viso's purposes.18 3 Confining Connell's policy analysis to subcontract-
177. Id. The Board found that section 8(1) and the construction industry proviso were the
product of congressional concern for the unique features of the construction industry, described in
text accompanying notes 126-30 supra. 239 N.L.R.B. at 269.
178. 239 N.L.R.B. at 270. A lawful construction-industry subcontracting agreement cannot be
coercively enforced. See note 101 supra See also Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 839 (1965),
enforcedsub nom. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers Local 769,405 F.2d 159 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
179. 239 N.L.R.B. 253 (1978).
180. Id.
181. 239 N.L.R.B. at 255-56.
182. Id. at 254-55. The agreement that the union sought resembled the Connell agreement
itself, and the Board appropriately found it unlawful. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recently decided an antitrust case with facts similar to Connell; the court used reasoning similar to
the Board's in Colorado Building Trader. See Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pa. Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 609 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc).
183. The Board stated in Woelke & .Romero that
the [Connell] Court's entire decision is cast in terms of the impact of the absence of a
collective-bargaining relationship upon the applicability of the proviso. . . . The bot-
tom line of the Court's opinion, as we construe it, is that the construction industry pro-
viso to Section 8(e) permits subcontracting clauses such as those here in the context of a
collective bargaining relationship, and possibly even without such a relationship if the
clauses are aimed at avoiding the Denver Building Trades problem.
239 N.L.R.B. at 250. This assessment of Connell closely resembles the language of Connell's hold-
ing. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
